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1 INTRODUCTION
In common with many other countries, South Africa
operates a special system for the taxation of mining
income. Special mining tax systems can include tax
rates and devices that are different from those
applying to other spheres of business activity,
special allowances and deductions, and distinctive
accounting rules.
During most of the twentieth century the taxation of
mining has provided a substantial proportion of the
tax revenue of the South African state. Since 1951 the
proportion has been lower than in preceding dec-
ades, but has still averaged between one-tenth and
one-eighth of total tax revenue in each decade up to
1990. There have been short periods when the rev-
enue share from mining has been much higher: in
1961-66 and, most dramatically, in 1980-82 following
the gold price boom of 1979-81. Gold mining alone
has yielded some 70-75 per cent of mining tax rev-
enues on average over the period since 1951.
In this article, an outsider to South Africa with expe-
rience of mineral tax regimes elsewhere in Africa,
and in other parts of the world, briefly outlines the
economic ideas underpinning mineral tax systems,
some general principles for appropriate systems and
then examines the recent reforms in South African
taxation of mining against the criteria suggested. In
conclusion, a number of questions are posed about
the recent reforms - questions which can best be
examined by those with more intimate local knowl-
edge and also those with responsibility for advising
on the priorities of a future government.
2 MINERAL TAXATION AND ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES
There are two main justifications for what, at first
sight, might seem like a violation of the economic
principle of tax neutrality in the use of special tax
systems for mining. Firstly, the scale of investment
required in a major mine, before any revenue is
generated, may be such that the risks incurred re-
quire special measures to accelerate payback (invest-
ment recovery) if the level of investment warranted
37
by geological conditions and market demand is to be
forthcoming. Secondly, mines are capable of gener-
ating rent (in the sense of a surplus over all necessary
costs, as defined below); this rent can be taxed by the
resource owner (usually the state) without necessar-
ily altering decisions about exploration, investment
or production that would be made in the absence of
a tax on mineral rent.
Mineral resource rent can be defined as the value of
the product of a mineral resource minus all the
necessary costs of production, including the mini-
mum returns to capital that are required, prior to the
investment decision, to induce investment. It is thus
the value of the resource to its owner.
With given mineral prices, the total amount of rent
in a mineral deposit will vary according to its tech-
nical characteristics (reserves, grades of ore, ease of
mining, recovery rates) and other physical factors
such as its location (near or far away from ports,
power stations and other infrastructure services).
The fluctuation of mineral prices will affect the
distribution of rents over time. The uncertainty of
costs and prices means that rent actually generated
may turn out to be much higher or lower than
initially expected (and sometimes non-existent).
Mines in operation may be generating rent in one
period and not in another.
A 'marginal' mine is one that just, but only just,
yields the investor's required after-tax rate of return
on outlays; a 'profitable' mine is one that yields
returns in excess of this requirement. A mine's
'profitability', in this context, thus refers to the extent
to which rent is generated, not to the amount of
accounting profit yielded.
A satisfactory mineral taxation system will reconcile,
as far as possible, the objectives of governments and
mining companies. The mining sector in South Af-
rica makes an economic contribution well beyond its
fiscal contribution alone, but one of its principal
benefits has historically come in the form of a major
contribution to government revenue. A South Afri-
can government, in present circumstances, might
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share the following objectives for fiscal policy to-
wards the mining sector in common with govern-
ments in other developing countries -
to minimize its own financial risks and outlays;
to encourage the maximum flow over time of
new investment into the mining sector that is
consistent with avoidance of severe macro-economic
disruption;
to obtain as large a share as possible of the rent
generated by successful mining operations and
thereby secure a valuable flow of foreign exchange
earnings and state revenues.
Although governments will frequently have other
objectives: employment creation, regional develop-
ment, or technology transfer, for example, pursuit of
such objectives by modification of fiscal policy to-
wards the mining sector, or by direct regulation, may
reduce the revenue available. Such objectives are
often better pursued by redeployment of mineral
revenues, once received, than by imposing restric-
tions which reduce revenue in the first place.
These government objectives require to be balanced
against the likely objectives of companies:-
to recover exploration and development outlays
as quickly as possible, with a reasonable rate of
return commensurate with market conditions and
the risks taken;
to dispose freely of profits (including, in the case
of foreign companies, the right to retain after-tax
profits offshore) and meet all debt service and other
current overseas obligations promptly;
to know in advance the financial terms on which
they may develop a mine and to be confident that
those terms will not be suddenly changed.
Companies may have other objectives too, some of
them only indirectly financial with respect to the
project in question: the exclusion of competitors, the
protection of exclusive marketing channels or pro-
prietary technology. Where these objectives do not
directly contribute to the maximization of reveflues
from the project itself, a government, as owner of the
resource, may need to ensure that the pace of project
development and efficient operation are not being
sacrificed, but these possible corporate objectives are
not directly relevant to the design of the fiscal regime.
These objectives can be reconciled in a tax regime
which concentrates the incidence of taxation on
ids bulletin vol 25 no 11994
38
realized resource rent. This requires that the regime
has in-built flexibility to respond to changes in
profitability over mine life. The high risks and
special financing needs of the mining industry call
for special depreciation arrangements which per-
mit rapid recovery of initial exploration and
development expenditures.
The balance of advantage in knowledge about the
likely value of a deposit will tend to shift from the
mining company to the government as a project
proceeds. If, however, governments permit inves-
tors access to deposits on generous terms, only to
impose onerous variations in taxes when high re-
turns are actually generated, investors will tend to
anticipate such changes and increase their risk premia
in the face of heightened political risk. Resource rent
available to be taxed will thereby be reduced both
because the required rate of return is higher and
because some potentially economic deposits will not
then be developed.
The common sense interpretation of these eco-
nomic arguments is, first, that a country's tax regime
for mining cannot move too far out of line with
that prevailing in countries with close substitute
deposits, or else investment will be diverted;
second, a government that carefully structures its
tax system to reduce risks faced by investors (for
example the risk that high royalties will cause
losses) can in the long run secure both more invest-
ment and higher tax revenue over the life of a mine;
and, third, that the pursuit of 'tax neutrality' with
respect to mining activity is not a simple matter of
setting the same overall taxes as are applicable to
other sectors.
Government tax policy can influence the pace, inten-
sity and efficiency of mineral development, the mag-
nitude of resource rent and the share which the
resource-owning country can obtain. An effective
tax package needs to balance two sets of considera-
tions. On the one hand the tax package should
minimize the additional risk (beyond any pre-tax
risk) to the investor of absolute loss; it should also
aim to tax realized rent once it is known rather than
a forecast of revenues which may turn out to be
wrong and which may imply the taxation of legiti-
mate costs. On the other hand, the package needs to
offer the prospect of stability of contract terms; thus
it should lower an investor's political risk that the
terms will subsequently be altered if a project turns
out to be especially profitable.
The balance of these considerations is likely to re-
quire: measures (such as accelerated depreciation)
to facilitate early payback of initial outlays; the
use of specially-tailored devices to ensure that
higher rates of taxation only apply to resource rent
as defined; the presence of some device providing
early revenue to the government, and a payment of
some sort whenever production is occurring; and
that the proportion of rent eventually taxed is high
enough to outweigh any temptation to governments
to change the terms, while leaving sufficient incen-
tive for efficient operation.
We now consider South Africa's mining taxation
reforms against the criteria offered by these
general principles.
3 MINING TAXATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
Although the mining industry in South Africa con-
tinued to provide a substantial portion of govern-
ment revenue until the mid-1980s, from 1988 on-
wards the mining tax contribution to state revenues
began to collapse. By 1992 mining contributed only
an estimated 2.55 per cent of tax revenues and the
outturn for 1993 is expected to be even lower. The
principal explanations for this collapse lie in the
persistence of relatively low precious metal prices in
the period since the boom of the early 1980s and in an
acceleration in the rate of real increase in mine work-
ing costs throughout the 1980s. The cost increases
appear to be mainly explained by the increasing
depths at which it is now necessary to work. Substan-
tial depreciation of the rand against trading partner
currencies (especially the US dollar) in recent years
has provided little relief in the face of a persistently
high rate of inflation in domestic costs - partly driven
by the rand depreciation itself.
The collapse of mining profits and tax contributions
has played an important part in creating conditions
of deep recession in the South African economy since
1989. During the recession the government's bor-
rowing requirement has multiplied fifteen fold in
nominal terms (R2.1 bn in 1989/90 to R31.7 bn in
1992/93) and risen to 9.5 per cent of GDP; at this level
it exceeds government capital expenditure by a sub-
stantial margin.
There is evidence, then, of a major fiscal problem to
which the collapse of mining revenues has made its
own substantial contribution. Since 1988, while these
circumstances have been developing, the South Afri-
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can Government has carried out a series of mining-
specific and general tax changes which amount to a
significant reform of mining taxation. The reform
package, in general terms, tends to reduce the overall
tax burden on mines and to reduce substantially the
element of special taxation of mineral rent that has
been a distinctive feature of South African mining
taxation for many years.
4 GOLD MINING TAXATION UP TO 1993
The old system appears to have been effective in
adapting the state's share of revenues to fluctuations
in realized profit while leaving distributable profits
at an acceptable level and allowing sufficient cash
flow retention for capital expenditure. Although not
designed as such, the system had features in common
with what is known internationally as the Resource
Rent Tax (RRT), a tax on discounted cash flows in
excess of those needed to yield a pre-agreed (or
legislated) rate of return over the life of a mine. The
South African system had evolved in isolation from
innovations elsewhere in the developing world but
incorporated many of the same features.
Capital expenditure is immediately expensed for tax
purposes in South Africa so, with the exception of
deductions against current income for interest pay-
ments (which are not made in conventional compu-
tations of net cash flow), profit corresponds to net
cash flow. The average effective mining tax rate
(including lease payments, see below) on profits so
defined has varied between a low point of 29.5 per
cent in 1958 and a peak of 61.5 per cent in 1989. Under
the formulae discussed below the effective rate
dropped sharply from 1990 onwards.
Until the passage of the Minerals Act, 1991, the rights
to mine precious metals were vested in the state.
Under Roman-Dutch law, the holder of land surface
rights also holds rights to minerals in the ground,
although the rights are separable; mineral rights in
this sense have been privately owned, except where
the state acquired them by some means and holds
them in the same manner as any private owner. The
'right to mine' precious metals, on the other hand,
was separately vested in the state as far back as 1871.
The state commonly leased this right to mine to
private sector miners in return for a share of revenues
from the lease area (known as the 'lease considera-
tion') determined on a profit-related formula. The
lease consideration was a deductible expense for
income tax purposes, like a royalty, and could be
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replaced by a royalty or other consideration. The
lease consideration evolved as a case-by-case impo-
sition and could vary significantly from mine to
mine. In more recent times it has been set at a
standard rate.
The lease formula was:
y = a - (ab / x)
where -
'y' is the lease rate to be determined
is the marginal lease rate
is the portion of lease free revenue
is the ratio of profit to revenue
(all these items are properly expressed as a
percentage but are more conveniently used in the
formula as number, thus if the ratio of profit to
revenue is 33 per cent 'x' is 33).
In the last three decades the 'a' factor has tended
to be set at 15, and the 'b' factor at 8 for post-1966
mines and at 6 for earlier mines. Thus if 'x' is 33 the
lease rate is 11.4 per cent for a post-1966 mine; if 'x'
falls to 20 the lease rate falls to 9.0 per cent. The
effective lease rates for pre-1966 mines are made
slightly higher by the different 'b' factor. The deter-
mination of 'profit' for the numerator in the calcula-
tion of 'x') involves deduction of all working costs
and all capital expenditure in the current year and
that previously unredeemed. The base on which the
lease consideration is levied is also 'profit' less a
further deduction of a six per cent allowance in
respect of capital expenditure in the current year
together with unredeemed prior capital expendi-
ture. The lease consideration is deductible for in-
come tax purposes.
The lease consideration was thus a pre-tax levy on a
base that approximated net cash flow with the addi-
tional deductions of (a) interest charges and (b) a
compounded capital allowance at six per cent per
annum. The rate of levy could vary with the ratio of
net cash flow to total income.
The South African approach to income tax for gold
mining evolved from the lease consideration formula
and was thus also profit-related. The income tax
formula is -
y = a - (ab I x)
where -
is the income tax rate to be determined
is the marginal tax rate
is the portion of tax-free revenue
'x' is the ratio of profit to revenue.
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Prior to the 1993 Budget, 'a' was 58 and 'b' was 5.
Thus with a ratio of profit to revenue ('x') of 33 per
cent, the income tax rate would be 49.2 per cent; with
'x' of 20 per cent the income tax rate would fall to 43.5
per cent. However, as recently as the tax year 1988/
89 the tax formula (including surcharges) yielded
much higher rates of tax: 'a' was 75 and 'b' was 6.
Thus with 'x' at 33% the tax rate was 61.4%; with 'x'
of 20% the tax rate was 52.5%. The effective rate of
normal company tax in the same year was 57.5%.
Capital expenditure can be expensed (with certain
exceptions mainly in the area of employee benefit
provision) - in other words, 100 per cent can be
immediately deducted for tax purposes. There is,
however, a degree of 'ring-fencing', i.e., a limitation
on the extent to which taxable income from one
mine can be reduced by capital expenditure on
another mine). In addition, capital expenditure
qualifies for a capital allowance, which is now 12 per
cent per annum compound for mines constructed
after 1990. Thus except for the treatment of interest
charges the South African mining income tax oper-
ates in a manner very similar to a resource rent tax.
The combination with the lease consideration pro-
vided two tiers of very progressive taxation, respon-
sive over the life of a mine to the evolution of costs
and prices and with the tax rates in any year variable
with current profitability.
5 REFORMS IN MINING TAXATION
Following partial acceptance by the government of
the recommendations of the Marais Committee of
1988, surcharges on mining tax and then the top
marginal rates of tax were progressively reduced.
The standard rate of company tax in South Africa has
also been steadily reduced and the objective appears
to have been adopted of taxing mines in 'average'
times at approximately the standard rate.
With effect from 31 December, 1993, the system of
state lease consideration falls away. This is because
the Minerals Act, 1991, repeals previous legislation
which vested the right to mine precious metals in the
state. There will then be no pre-tax profit-related
levy or royalty payment to the state (except in those
cases where the state holds the mineral rights and can
obtain such a payment in the same way as any private
holder).
In the Budget of March, 1993, gold mining compa-
nies were offered the option of moving to new
parameters in the income tax formula: 'a' would be
set at 49 and 'b' at 5. New mines will have the same
options as existing mines. The revisions reduce the
applicable rate of tax by just over 15 per cent (e.g.,
from 49.2 per cent to 41.6 per cent where 'x' is 33).
However, gold mines opting for the new system will
also have to pay a 15 per cent Secondary Tax on
Companies (STC) on distributed profits. This tax is
paid at 15% of the amount distributed net of STC
(i.e., 15/115 of the gross amount) and dividends
received are deducted from distributions in calculat-
ing the tax base. The STC is an economy-wide tax,
introduced as part of a new dual tax system designed
to encourage re-investment, and is only incidental to
the mining tax reforms. Dividend remittances to
non-residents attract an additional 15 per cent non-
resident shareholder tax (dividend withholding tax).
These changes follow others made progressively
since 1989 which have had the effect of reducing the
maximum marginal tax rate from much higher rates
(in excess of 80 per cent including lease considera-
tion) to those described here as the current system: 49
per cent plus STC on distributed profits. The new
system is closer to normal company taxation except
for the effect of the formula in raising tax in good
years while reducing tax in bad years, but will it be as
effective as the old system in securing an appropriate
share of mineral rent for the state?
In terms of the criteria for mineral taxation suggested
here, the old system appears to have performed
reasonably well. The old system was attuned to the
taxation of mineral rent, although the implied rate of
return allowed on new investments before rent taxa-
tion was probably too low. The system reduced risk
and costs by the absence of any royalty based solely
on output or gross revenue, and by the system of
immediate expensing of capital outlays. With a
mature (and tax-paying) mining industry such as
that in South Africa, the absence of royalty and the
expensing of capital did not present the cash flow
problem for government that would exist in a coun-
try at an earlier stage of mining industry develop-
ment. There was substantial taxation of high rents,
imposed in a manner that responded to current levels
of profits as well as life-of-mine economics. It could
be argued that, by the mid-1980s, the tax and lease
formulae produced marginal rates of taxation that
were too high for the future growth of the industry;
these marginal rates have already been reduced, and
the need to reduce marginal rates does not imply
rejection of rent taxation additional to normal busi-
ness taxation.
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The reformed system aims to tax mining on average
at approximately the standard corporate rate of tax.
There will be no special rent taxation, except to the
now limited extent that the formula yields a higher
rate of income tax in periods of high profits; this is
balanced by reduction of taxation in years of low
profits and, unless further reforms are made, the
expensing of capital items will remain in place. Min-
ing will thus be treated in some respects more gener-
ously than other sectors (except where businesses in
other sectors receive the special privileges available
in economic development areas).
In practice, mining companies in South Africa have
tended to distribute most of their profits and to fund
major capital expenditure by seeking fresh equity. It
is understood that gold mining companies have all
elected to remain on the old formula (approximating
a standard rate of 49 per cent) since the STC incentive
to earnings retention is of little relevance.
The new system may encourage re-investment and
new investment, though it is difficult to judge whether
it will do so to an extent greater than a well-designed
system which continues to tax mineral rent. If indus-
try expansion proves to be profitable, the revenues to
the state will be reduced under the new system
compared with what might be possible under an
appropriate system of rent taxation.
How do the reforms compare with developments in
mining taxation elsewhere? Australia moved re-
cently to end a long period of tax exemption for gold
mining. Immediate expensing of capital outlays is
not available. Australian States (with the exception
among states with significant mining industries of
Western Australia for gold) have traditionally charged
fairly significant royalties (at rates up to 5 per cent of
gross revenues.
The 'big three' among developing countries that
have recently attracted significant mining invest-
ment are Chile, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea -
the last of these is now important in international
gold supply. None of these countries permits imme-
diate expensing of capital items for income tax pur-
poses, but each of them offers some form of acceler-
ated depreciation alternative. Chile levies no royalty
and no direct tax, other than withholding taxes, in
addition to normal corporate income tax (which can
be fixed by election at 49.5 per cent, or vary with the
general corporate rate - currently at an effective level
of 35 per cent). In Chile, however, a large portion of
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the copper-mining industry remains state-owned
within CODELCO and a fixed proportion of gross
revenues is assigned for military use; in a sense,
therefore, mineral rent across the mining sector as a
whole is appropriated for state use by means other
than taxation. Indonesia levies modest (1-2 per cent)
royalties on gross revenues from precious metal min-
ing; the exact levels vary with market prices. Indone-
sia has moved away from levying additional profits
taxes in recent years and operates a marginal rate of
income tax of 35 percent, plus fairly severe withhold-
ing taxes. In Indonesia, however, conditions are
imposed requiring divestiture of portions of equity
to local investors within specified periods of time.
Papua New Guinea charges a low royalty (1.25 per
cent), income tax at 35 per cent (48 per cent for
branches), additional profits tax at 35 per cent after
approximately a 20 per cent discounted cash flow
rate of return has been earned, and then levies with-
holding tax at 17 per cent on dividend remittances
abroad. Papua New Guinea's regime comes closest
in overall effect to the former South African regime,
though with much lower top marginal rates of tax..
There is thus a wide range of international practice
(and a wide range of practice is evolving among
African countries). Much depends on local
prospectivity and local priorities for the deployment
of any mineral rents. It is not clear that the interna-
tional environment in the mining industry required
South Africa to move as sharply as it has done, by
abolition of the lease consideration and reduction in
tax rates, to reduce the tax burden on the mining
sector and depart from its long-established practices
in taxation of mineral rents.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The South African reforms prompt an outsider to ask
a number of questions.
I Was the existing system of mining taxation in
some way reducing efficiency in production, or de-
terring exploration and new investment?
2 Are the reforms directed at protecting govern-
ment revenue-raising capacity from mining in the
short or long term? In other words, does the govern-
ment believe that restructuring and reduction of the
tax burden is necessary for the survival of parts of the
mining industry and for the stimulation of new in-
vestment in the long run?
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3 Does the government now believe that the state
has no call upon revenues from its mineral resources
additional to those yielded by normal business taxa-
tion? Does the Government also consider that the
mining industry should continue to benefit from
immediate expensing of capital items, from addi-
tional capital allowances and from a lower-than-
normal tax rate in periods of low profitability - in
other words that it should be treated more favour-
ably than other sectors?
4 The Minerals Act, 1991, appears to have legis-
lated a major change in property rights by placing the
right to mine precious metals and stones back in
private hands. Was this done for political or techni-
cal reasons, or was it done as a necessary precondi-
tion for removing a tier of taxation in the form of the
lease consideration?
5 The accumulated changes since the mid-1980s
are likely, in times of profitable mining activity, to
leave a substantially larger share of mineral revenues
in the hands of foreign and domestic mining comp a-
nies, at the expense of government revenues. Is such
a change sustainable when a major alteration in the
structure of state power in South Africa is in pros-
pect?
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